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Abstract  
 
 
 
In the current efforts of harmonizing the standards and enforcement of IPRs protection 
worldwide, this paper  explores software piracy trajectories and dynamics in Africa. Using a 
battery of estimation techniques that ignore as well as integrate short-run disturbances in time-
dynamic fashion, we answer the big questions policy makers are most likely to ask before 
harmonizing IPRs regimes in the battle against software piracy. Three main findings are 
established. (1) African countries with low software piracy rates are catching-up their 
counterparts with higher rates; implying despite existing divergent IPRs systems, convergence 
in piracy rate could be a genuine standard-setting platform. (2) Legal origins do not play a 
very significant role in the convergence process. (3)  A genuine timeframe for  standardizing 
IPRs laws in the fight against piracy is most likely between a horizon of 4 to 8 years. In other 
words, full (100%) convergence within the specified horizon will mean the enforcements of 
IPRs regimes without distinction of nationality and locality. 
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1. Introduction  
 
 It has become abundantly clear that, for any country, region or continent to be actively 
involved in the global economy, it must be competitive. Competition derives from intellectual 
capital, which is protected by intellectual property laws. In recent history, there has been a 
wide consensus on the key role that intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection play in 
promoting innovation processes and economic growth.  Much recently, technological progress 
has not only brought about an increased availability of information and technology related 
products, but also the proliferation of technology used to copy or pirate such commodities. In 
the light of these concerns, efforts are being placed on increasing and harmonizing the 
standard and enforcement of IPRs protection worldwide. However, the issue of consolidating  
and harmonizing laws to curtail the proliferation of pirated goods is particularly pronounced 
in developing countries. In this paper, we assess the trajectories and dynamics of software 
piracy in Africa using a battery of estimation approaches. Based on the results, we are able to 
provide the much needed policy recommendations on the feasibility of IPRs law 
harmonization across the continent, as well a genuine timeframe for the standard-setting 
process.  
 The debate has centered around IPRs protection, with some scholars postulating that 
increased protection of IPRs stimulates economic growth and development through the 
appealing impact on factor productivity (Gould & Gruben, 1996; Falvey et al., 2006). On the 
other hand, skeptics are of the position that IPRs protection and adherence to international 
treaties (laws) may seriously limit the growth prospects of developing countries (Yang & 
Maskus, 2001). This strand is of the view that, less tight IPRs regimes are necessary (at least 
in the short-term) for developing countries, to enable knowledge spillovers, imperative for 
growth and development. According to them, the existing technology in developing countries 
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is more imitative and/or adaptive in nature and not suitable for the creation of new 
innovations1.   
 In the light of the debate, there is a growing importance in the impact of IPRs 
protection on promotion of innovation, technological advancements  and economic 
development. Yet, while theoretical literature has addressed the concern to some degree, little 
scholarly attention has been devoted to empirical literature. The bulk of empirical studies has 
examined the socio-economic determinants of piracy in several copyright industries (Bezmen 
& Depken, 2004; Banerjee et al., 2005; Andrés, 2006; Bezmen & Depken, 2006; Peitz & 
Waelbroeck, 2006; Goel & Nelson, 2009; Andrés & Goel, 2012). To the best of our 
knowledge, no study has yet addressed current efforts placed on harmonizing the standard and 
enforcement of IPRs protection in Africa. Upholding blanket IPRs regimes for software 
piracy through bilateral and multilateral treaties may not be effective unless they are 
contingent on the prevail trajectories and dynamics of software piracy in the continent. Hence, 
policy makers are most likely to ask the following questions before considering harmonizing 
IPRs regimes in the fight against piracy. (1) Is software piracy converging within Africa? (2) 
If so, what is the degree and timing of convergence? While the answer to the first question 
will guide on the feasibility of harmonizing blanket IPRs regimes, the answer to the second 
will determine the timing of  the blanket IPRs regimes  through multilateral and bilateral 
treaties. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines existing literature. 
Data and methodology are discussed and outlined respectively in Section 3. Section 4 covers 
empirical analysis. We conclude with Section 5.   
 
 
 
                                                 
1This stance has gained prominence in the debate over  if ‘permission’ should be granted to enable ‘copying’ of 
life-saving pharmaceuticals, especially those used in the management of HIV/AIDS in developing countries 
most affected and least likely to afford such treatments.  
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2. Intuition, literature and scope  
 
2.1 Intuition 
 
 The intuition motivating this paper typically follows the evidence of income 
convergence across countries which has been investigated in the context of neoclassical 
growth models, originally developed by the pioneering works of Baumol (1986), Barro  & 
Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995) and Mankiw et al. (1992). The theoretical underpinnings of 
income convergence are abundant in the empirical growth literature (Solow, 1956; Swan, 
1956) and have recently been applied in other fields of development. While there is a theory 
and vast empirical work on per capita income convergence, there is yet not a theory on 
convergence in other development branches, e.g financial systems. However, there is growing 
importance of empirical convergence application to financial markets (Bruno et al., 2011; 
Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu, 2012). In the light of these developments, aware of the risks of 
‘doing measurement without theory’; we argue that, reporting facts even in the absence of a 
formal theoretical model maybe a useful scientific activity. Hence, we concur with Costantini 
& Lupi (2005) in the assertion that applied econometrics has other tasks than merely 
validating or refuting economic theories. 
 The intuition underlying the linkage between software piracy and  harmonization of 
IPRs is twofold; (1) convergence in software piracy rate will imply,  the adoption of 
multilateral treaties on IPRs is feasible and; (2) full (100%) convergence will mean, the 
enforcements of particular IPRs regimes without distinction of nationality and locality. Since 
it is unlikely to find convergence ( in laws emphasizing IPRs) within a very heterogeneous set 
of countries, the sample is sub-divided into two homogenous panels, based on legal-origins. 
The premise of this distinction is the emphasis legal origins place on private property rights 
vis-à-vis those of the state (La Porta et al., 1998). While English common-law countries place 
more emphasis on private property rights (or IPRs), French civil-law focuses more on state 
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power. In summary, the underlying logic for this segmentation is that, the institutional web of 
informal norms, formal rules and enforcement characteristics affect software piracy and IPRs 
(La Porta et al., 1988; North, 1990, 1994). 
 
2. 2 Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and development  
 
 Borrowing from Bezmen & Depken (2004), there are two main avenues along which 
intellectual property (IP) and the strength of IPRs regimes are thought to influence the level of 
economic growth and development. The first strand captures the extent to which IPRs 
influence the creation of new knowledge and information within nations, as well as the 
diffusion of existing knowledge across countries. The second strand is focused on the indirect 
effect of a nation’s IPRs regime on international transactions that provide factors imperative 
to the growth process.  
 In the first strand on ‘creation and dissemination of information’, IPRs protection 
could be traced to the foundation of endogenous theories of economic growth whereby, 
investment in research and development (R&D) rewards individual investors with profit 
(returns) and also increase society’s stock of knowledge. Lowering the cost of future 
innovation, fosters the accumulation of knowledge for economic growth (Romer, 1990; 
Grossman & Helpman, 1991). The underlying wisdom of tighter and restrictive IPRs is based 
on the notion that, protection of IPRs serves as a stimulus to growth by encouraging 
innovations and inventions. Recently, many newly industrialized countries have pushed for 
stronger IPRs via bilateral, multilateral and regional arrangements. This difference in 
approach could be attributed to the interest of developing countries to specialize in labor 
intensive production in agricultural industries. These industries, until much recently have 
largely been supported by public expenditures on research and technology and have greatly 
benefited from shared knowledge spillovers.  
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 In the second strand, IPRs may also affect a nation’s growth and development process 
through their influence on a nation’s ability to engage in international transactions  such as 
trade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows and technology transfers (Bezmen & Depken, 
2004).  The endogenous growth theories have presented international trade as an important 
stimulus to economic prosperity, as access to world markets could spur greater utilization of 
human resources (Todaro & Smith, 2003), and facilitate the transmission of technology by 
providing contact with foreign counterparts and direction of domestic resources towards more 
research intensive sectors. Nevertheless, these models do not necessarily predict that openness 
leads to economic growth for all countries and under all circumstances; principally because, 
theoretical prediction depends on country-specific conditions. It has been well documented 
that a stronger IPRs regime is a crucial factor in attracting the inflows of FDI and 
technological transfers (Lee & Mansfield, 1996), stimulating exports (Maskus & Penubarti, 
1995) and increasing the likelihood of investment undertaken by multinational enterprises 
(Mansfield, 1994; Seyoum, 1996). On the other hand, stronger IPRs protection could mitigate 
the need for FDI (Yang & Maskus, 2001).  
 
2.3 Scope and positioning of the paper  
 
 A great bulk of the literature has examined the determinants of the willingness to 
pirate software by assessing the socio-economic factors that affect piracy. Strong conclusions 
have been established that nations with higher income and greater individualism have lower 
piracy rates (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995; Gould & Gruben, 1996; Park & Ginarte, 1997;  
Rushing & Thompson, 1996, 1999; Husted, 2000; Marron & Steel, 2000; Kranenberg & 
Hogenbirk, 2003; Kim, 2004; Depken & Simmons, 2004). A vast empirical literature has also 
focused on the socio-economic determinants of piracy rates in several copyright industries 
(Andrés, 2006; Banerjee et al., 2005; Bezmen & Depken, 2006; Peitz & Waelbroeck, 2006; 
Goel & Nelson, 2009; Andrés & Goel, 2012). For the most part, the above studies have 
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concentrated on developed countries and the emerging economies of Latin America and East 
Asia. The focus of this paper on the sparsely represented African continent in the literature 
also draws from the debate over the ‘East Asian Miracle’2.  
Europe and North America have fully understood the dynamics of IP and inexorably 
driving developments in the global and international arena. Other regions like South America 
and Asia are responding in calculated steps that underscores the role of IP in the current 
pursuit of national, regional and international initiatives. Consequently, different nations have 
standards of protection of IP. The recent trend of globalization strengthened by several 
multilateral and regional treaties further creates some international minimum standard for IP 
protection.  In Africa, IP issues are assuming central stage in discussions on development of 
the continent.  
With recent developments in ICTs, the concern over software piracy has retained 
scholarly attention. International organizations are currently advocating global convergence in 
IP as a prerequisite for successful innovation strategies. The difficulties of achieving such 
harmonization are however evident from the attempts of several nations to develop divergent 
IP systems. Hence, IPRs are growingly implicated in standard-setting activities. Standard-
setting is increasingly important in software piracy as a means of reducing transaction cost. 
Standards also have a particular important role in ensuring compatibility and interconnectivity 
of products and services.  
                                                 
2Additional support for the possibility that the changing strength of IPRs regimes is based on a nation’s level of 
development or current technological ability could be traced in the rapid growth witnessed by South-East Asia. 
Some evidence suggest that the ‘East Asian Miracle’ could have originated from weaker IPRs regimes at the 
early stages of these nations’ development in addition to their accumulation of capital. These nations’ capacity to 
absorb, replicate and duplicate foreign innovations might have contributed to their relatively high growth rates. 
Further evidence has suggested that, as these countries  became significant producers of new technologies and 
innovations, their IPRs regimes tightened. While Nelson & Pack (1999) have postulated that the productive 
assimilation of existing (foreign) productive techniques and technologies ‘was a critical component of the 
success of these countries’, Maskus (2000) cautions that weaker protection of IPRs will not necessarily be 
beneficial for developing countries as it may cause them to remain dependent on older and less efficient outdated 
technologies.  
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 Given the growing role of IPRs in software piracy protection, policy makers are more 
likely today to ask the following questions. Is the rate of software piracy converging within 
homogenous sets of countries (clubs)? If so, then at what momentum are countries with low 
piracy rates catching-up their counterparts with higher rates? What is the timing of full 
(100%)  convergence in the rate of piracy? Answers to these questions could provide relevant 
answers to timing, enforcement and standardization of IPRs regimes in the fight against 
piracy. To the best of our knowledge, there is yet no model for standard-setting in the 
promotion of IPRs and fight against piracy. The manner in which standards are set and 
harmonized have important consequences for the cost of products, economic efficiency and 
innovation. Upholding blanket IPRs regimes (against software piracy) through bilateral and 
multilateral treaties may not be effective unless they are contingent on the prevailing 
trajectories and dynamics of software piracy in Africa. The empirical section will throw the 
much needed light into the pressing policy questions outlined above.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
3.1.1 Measuring piracy 
 
Borrowing from SIIA (2000), software piracy is defined as “the unauthorized copying 
of computer software which constitutes copyright infringement for either commercial or 
personal use”. Due to software piracy potentially taking place in many avenues – e.g., 
organized copiers, piracy by individuals and commercial or business piracy, obtaining an 
accurate measure of the prevalence of software piracy remains a challenge in the literature. 
There are many types of piracy and according to the Business Software Alliance (BSA), we 
can distinguish among: 1) end user copying; 2) downloading; and 3) counterfeiting. The level 
of piracy is computed as the variation in demand for new software applications (estimated 
from PC shipments) and the legal supply of software.  In the current work, the measure of 
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piracy employed is the percentage of software (primarily business software) in a country that 
is illegally installed (without a license) annually and is taken to capture the level of software 
piracy. This variable is reported in percentages, scaling from 0 % (no piracy) to 100 % (i.e., 
all software installed is pirated). Piracy rates are obtained from the Business Software 
Alliance (BSA, 2007). More details on measurement could be obtained from BSA (2009)3.  
BSA is an industry group; nevertheless its data on software piracy, is the best cross-country 
measure currently available, though object of some inherent upward bias.4  The data on 
software piracy could be viewed more broadly as proxying for the extent of digital piracy.   
Owing to constraints in piracy data availability, the data include annual observations 
for 11 African countries for the years 2000-2010. Details about variable definitions (and data 
sources), descriptive statistics (with presentation of countries) and correlation analysis 
(showing the basic correlations between key variables used in this paper)  are presented in 
Appendix 2, Appendix 1 and Appendix 3 respectively.  The summary statistics of the 
variables used in the panel regressions show that there is quite a degree of variation in the data 
utilized so that one should be confident that reasonable estimated relationships should emerge. 
Both  the standard deviations and minimum/maximum values validate this assertion and 
further lend credit to the inappropriateness of an estimation model that assumes a particular 
functional distribution. The purpose of the correlation matrix is to mitigate issues resulting 
from overparametization and multicolinearity.  Based on the correlation coefficients, there do 
not appear to be any serious concerns in terms of the relationships to be estimated. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3The BSA data primarily measures the piracy of commercial software.  We are unaware of any publicly available 
cross-national data on end-user software piracy.  See Png (2008) for a discussion on the reliability of piracy data. 
Also see Traphagan & Griffith (1998). 
4Among the many researchers that have used this data are: Marron & Steel (2000); Banerjee et al. (2005); 
Andrés (2006);  and Goel & Nelson (2009).  
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3.1.2  Control variables   
 
 In the regressions we shall control for institutional quality (rule of law), economic 
prosperity (GDP growth rate), financial depth (money supply), trade openness (trade), literacy 
in computing (number of Personal Computer (PC) users) and financial openness (FDI). While 
the first variable is an estimate, the last three are in ratios of GDP.  We expect the ‘rule of 
law’ and ‘economic prosperity’ to decrease and increase the piracy rate respectively. Money 
supply (which reflects an extensive use of currency) and globalization (trade and FDI) may 
either have a positive or negative incidence on piracy, depending to the country’s tendency 
towards IPRs. From common-sense, the number of PC users should have a positive effect on 
software piracy.  
 
3.2 Methodology  
 
The estimation approach will be based on β-convergence due to constraints in the data 
set. The use of cointegration and unit roots are not convenient because of limited degrees of 
freedom in homogenous panels or convergence clubs. More so, the alternative view of 
convergence (σ-convergence)  which is of the position that a group of economies converge 
when the cross-section variance of the variable under consideration declines, is also 
inappropriate because our data structure is panel. Our estimation procedure typically follows 
the evidence of income convergence across countries which has been investigated in the 
context of pioneering works in neoclassical growth models (Baumol, 1986; Barro  & Sala-i-
Martin, 1992, 1995; Mankiw et al., 1992). The theoretical underpinnings of income 
convergence are well documented in the empirical growth literature (Solow, 1956; Swan, 
1956). 
Borrowing from  the convergence literature (Fung, 2009, 3),  the two equations below 
are the standard approaches in the literature for investigating conditional convergence if  tiW ,  
is taken as strictly exogenous.  
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titititititi WYYY ,,,,, )ln()ln()ln( εξηδβ τττ ++++=− −−−
   
   (1) 
 
tititititi WYY ,,,, )ln()ln( εξηδσ ττ ++++= −−
                      (2) 
 
 Where σ = 1+ β, tiY ,  is the proxy for the rate of piracy in country i at period t.  tiW ,  is a vector 
of determinants of piracy,  iη  is a country-specific effect,  tξ  is a time-specific constant and  
ti ,ε  an error term. Consistent with the neo-classical growth model, a statistically significant 
negative coefficient on β  in Eq. (1) suggests that, countries relatively close to their steady 
state in ‘piracy-rate  growth’ will experience a slowdown in the growth of piracy, known as 
conditional convergence (Narayan et al., 2011, 2).  In the same vein, according to Fung (2009, 
3) and recent African convergence literature (Asongu, 2012), if  10 << σ in Eq. (2) , then  
tiY ,  is dynamically stable around the path with a trend piracy rate the same as that of  tW , and 
with a height relative to the level of tW .  The variables contained in τ−tiW ,  and the individual 
effect iη  are measures of the long-term level  the software market is converging to. Therefore, 
the country-specific effect iη  emphasizes other determinants of a country’s steady state not 
captured by τ−tiW , . 
 Conditions for convergence elucidated above are valid if and only if, tiW ,  exhibits 
strict exogeneity. Unfortunately, this is not the case in the real world because, while the 
institutional quality, economic prosperity, globalization, financial development and literacy in 
computing (components of tiW , ) influence piracy rate, the reverse effect is also true. Thus, we 
are confronted here with the issue of endogeneity  where control variables ( tiW , ) are 
correlated with the error term ( ti ,ε ). Also, country and time specific effects could be 
correlated with other variables in the model, which is very probable with lagged dependent 
variables included in the equations. This concern for endogeneity has been substantially 
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documented in the piracy literature (Ginarte & Park, 1997; Bezmen & Depken, 2004)5. A way 
of dealing with the problem of the correlation between the individual specific-effect and the 
lagged dependent variables consists of eliminating the individual effect by first differencing. 
Therefore Eq. (2) becomes: 
)()()ln()ln()ln(
,,2,,2,,,, ττττττ εεδσ −−−−−− −+−+−=− titititititititi WWYYYY
                 (3) 
 
However Eq. (3) presents another issue;  estimation by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
is still biased because there remains a correlation between the lagged endogenous independent 
variable and the disturbance term. To solve this issue, we estimate the regression in 
differences jointly with the regression in levels using the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation. Arellano & Bond (1991) suggested an application of the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) exploiting all the orthogonality conditions between the lagged 
dependent variables and the error term. The procedure employs lagged levels of the regressors 
as instruments in the difference equation, and lagged differences of the regressors as 
instruments in the levels equation, therefore exploiting all the orthogonality conditions 
between the lagged dependent variables and the error term. Between the difference GMM 
estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991) and system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; 
Blundell & Bond, 1998), in a  bid for robustness, we shall  use both in the empirical analysis. 
However, in event of conflict of interest in the results, those of the system GMM will be given 
priority; in line with  Bond et al. (2001, 3-4)6.  
                                                 
5As emphasized by Bezmen & Depken (2004), studies assessing the piracy-development nexus are subject to 
potential endogeneity problems, because it is likely that a nation’s level of development is a crucial factor in its 
choice  of or adherence to a particular IPRs regime. This confirms an earlier  position by Ginarte & Park (1997) 
who found strong evidence that the level of economic development explains the strength of patent protection 
provided by individual countries.  
6
 “We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested by 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The system estimator exploits an assumption about the 
initial conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series, and it has been 
shown to perform well in simulations. The necessary restrictions on the initial conditions are potentially 
consistent with standard growth frameworks, and appear to be both valid and highly informative in our 
empirical application. Hence we recommend this system GMM estimator for consideration in subsequent 
empirical growth research”. Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4).  
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The GMM estimation approach has been extensively applied in the convergence 
literature. In contrast to Narayan et al. (2011), we shall adopt Fung (2009) owing to software 
specificities7. In model specification, we opt for the second-step GMM because it corrects the 
residuals for heteroscedasticity8. The assumption of no auto-correlation in the residuals is 
crucial as lagged variables are to be used as instruments for the dependent variables. 
Moreover, the estimation depends on the assumption that the lagged values of the dependent 
variable and other independent variables are valid instruments in the regression. When  the 
error terms of the level equation are not auto-correlated, the first-order auto-correlation of the 
differenced residuals should be significant while their second-order auto-correlation should 
not be. The validity of the instruments is examined with the Sargan over-identifying 
restrictions (OIR)  test.  
 According to Islam (1995, 14),  yearly time spans are too short to be appropriate for 
studying convergence, as short-run disturbances may loom substantially in such brief time 
spans. Therefore, considering the data span of 10 years, we use both two-year and three-year 
non-overlapping intervals9.  This implies in our analysis,  τ is set to 2 and 3 respectively. We 
also assess the incidence of short-term disturbances by setting τ to 1 under the hypothesis of  
‘no intervals’. Hence, we compute the implied rate of convergence by calculating σ/3, σ/2, σ/1 
for three-year, two-year and ‘no intervals’ respectively. For example, with σ/3, we divide the 
estimated coefficient of the lagged differenced endogenous variable by 3 because we have 
used a three year interval to absorb the short-term disturbances. When the absolute value of 
the estimated autoregressive coefficient is greater than zero but less than one ( 10 << σ ), we 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7
 While Narayan et al. (2011) have used Eq. (1) in the absence of fixed effects, this paper  applies Eqs. (2) and 
(3) instead; in line with Fung (2009). The Fung (2009) approach  has been used in recent African convergence 
literature (Asongu, 2012).  
8
 In the first-step, the residuals are assumed to be homoscedastic.  
9
 We have 6 two-year  non-overlapping intervals: 2000; 2001-2002; 2003-2004; 2005-2006; 2007-2008; 2009-
2010. There are  also four  three-year  non-overlapping intervals: 2000-2001; 2002-2004; 2005-2007; 2008-
2010. For both types of non-overlapping intervals, owing to data and periodical constraints, the first interval is 
short of one year.  
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conclude the existence of convergence. The broader interpretation suggests, past differences 
have less proportionate impact on future differences, denoting the variation on the left hand 
side of Eq. (3) is decreasing overtime as the country is converging to a steady state (Asongu, 
2012).  
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1 Presentation of results 
  
This section investigates three principal issues: (1) assessment of the presence of 
convergence; (2) computation of the speed of convergence and; (3) determination of the time 
needed for full (100%) convergence. The summary of overall results is presented in Table 1 
where-in the three issues are addressed. Results for absolute (unconditional) and conditional 
convergence are presented in Table 2 and Table 3 respectively.  
Absolute convergence is estimated with just the lagged difference of the endogenous 
variable as independent variable whereas, conditional convergence is with respect to Eqs. (2) 
and (3) in the presence of control variables. Thus, unconditional convergence is estimated in 
the absence of tiW , : vector of determinants (rule of law, GDP growth, money supply, PC 
users, trade and FDI) of software piracy. To examine the validity of the model and indeed the 
convergence hypothesis, we perform two tests, notably the Sargan-test which examines the 
over-identification restrictions and the Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation which 
assesses the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Sargan-test examines if the instruments 
are uncorrelated with the error term in the equation of interest. The null hypothesis is the 
position that the instruments as a group are strictly exogenous (do not suffer from 
endogeneity), which is required for the validity of the GMM estimates. The p-values of 
estimated coefficients are presented in brackets  in the line following the reported values of 
the estimated coefficients. We notice that the Sargan-test statistics often appear with a p-value 
greater than 0.10, hence its null hypothesis is not rejected in all the regressions. We only 
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report the second order autocorrelation: AR(2) test in first difference because it is more 
relevant than AR(1) as it detects autocorrelation in levels. However, owing to constraints in 
degrees of freedom for the three-year NOI specifications, we report only AR(1)10 for this 
particular type of NOI. For most estimated models, we are unable to reject the AR(2) null 
hypothesis for the absence of autocorrelation, especially for conditional convergence 
specifications. Therefore, there is robust evidence that most of the models are deficient of 
autocorrelation at the 1% significance level. 
A summary of the results from Tables 2-3 is presented in Table 1. This includes 
findings for Absolute Convergence (AC), Conditional Convergence (CC), the  Speed of 
Absolute Convergence (SAC), the Speed of Conditional Convergence (SCC) and the rate 
required to achieve full (100%) convergence in both types of convergences.  
From a general standpoint, the following conclusions could be drawn. (1) The choice 
of the GMM approach affects the nature of the results substantially. (2) Full data (without 
mitigation of short-run disturbances) does not provide significant results for the most part 
(See AR(2) tests results for AC). This confirms the position of Islam (1995, 14)  on the 
inappropriateness of assessing convergence with annual data, owing to short-run disturbances. 
(3) The convergence rate (years to convergence) decreases (increase) as the number of non-
overlapping intervals increase. (4) The two-year NOI has significant results in both AC and 
CC for the system GMM specification. (5) Also, in the system GMM, but for the findings on 
AC in ‘Full data’ for Africa, results in terms of significance are alike across panels.  
 Given the heterogeneous nature of the findings, our interpretation will be based on 
system GMM results of the two-year NOI for the following reasons. (1) The edge of system 
GMM estimators over difference GMM estimators has already been outlined in the 
methodology section. (2) The choice of the two-year NOI has two premises: on the one hand, 
                                                 
10
 This poses no issue because overall, interpretations will not be based on the three-year NOI results. Their use 
enriches the analysis in providing trajectories and dynamics hitherto unexplored in convergence empirics.  
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‘Full data’ is not used in mainstream literature because it is inherent of short-run disturbances;  
on the other hand, the variability in the data (suggesting short-run disturbances) is not quite 
great (see Appendix 1) and hence, does not give much justification for the three-year NOI. 
Based on the two-year NOI and system GMM, the following findings could be 
established. (1) Legal-origin is not a very significant  factor in determining convergence in the 
rate of software piracy. This is true for both AC and CC.  (2) The rate of AC is higher than 
that of CC. In Africa,  AC (time required for full convergence) is 47.85% per annum (4.17 
years) while for CC it is: 29.60% per annum (6.75 years). For common-law countries, AC 
(CC) is 48.20 (26.38) % per annum and achievement of 100% convergence is in 4.14 (7.58) 
years. Regarding  civil-law countries, AC (CC) is 48.39 (25.70) % per annum and 
achievement of 100% convergence is in 4.13 (7.78) years. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of results on Absolute and Conditional Convergences  
          
 Panel A: Difference GMM 
 Africa English French 
 Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI 
Absolute C (AC) Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No Yes 
% of A.C 31.80% 11.14% n.a 30.54% 12.55% n.a n.a n.a 7.76% 
Years to A.C  3.14 Yrs 17.95 Yrs n.a 3.27 Yrs 15.93 Yrs n.a n.a n.a 38.65 Yrs 
          
Conditional C (CC) No No Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes 
% of CC n.a n.a 10.06% n.a 25.20% 21.36% n.a n.a 12.90% 
Years to CC  n.a n.a 29.82 Yrs n.a 7.93 Yrs 14.04 Yrs n.a n.a 23.25 Yrs 
          
 Panel B: System GMM 
 Africa English French 
 Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI 
Absolute C (AC) Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
% of AC 98.60% 47.85% n.a n.a 48.20% n.a n.a 48.39% n.a 
Years to AC  1.01 Yrs 4.17 Yrs n.a n.a 4.14 Yrs n.a n.a 4.13 Yrs n.a 
          
Conditional C (CC) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
% of CC n.a 29.60% 17.06% n.a 26.38% 14.63% n.a 25.70% 9.56% 
Years to CC  n.a 6 .75 Yrs 17.58 Yrs n.a 7.58 Yrs 20.50 Yrs n.a 7.78 Yrs 31.38 Yrs 
          
AC: Absolute Convergence. CC: Conditional Convergence.  English : English Common Law countries.  French: French Civil Law countries. 
Yr: Year.  NOI: Non overlapping intervals. 
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Table 2: Absolute convergence  
          
 Panel A: Difference GMM 
 Africa English French 
 
Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI 
Initial  0.318*** 0.222*** -0.188 0.305*** 0.251*** 0.017 -0.383 0.126 -0.233** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.116) (0.000) (0.002) (0.958) (0.581) (0.600) (0.041) 
AR(1) --- --- -0.286 --- --- -0.733 --- --- 0.180 
   (0.774)   (0.463)   (0.856) 
AR(2) -2.308** -0.304 --- -1.913* 0.809 --- -0.399 -0.864 --- 
 (0.021) (0.760)  (0.055) (0.418)  (0.689) (0.387)  
Sargan OIR 10.154 9.287 2.377 5.104 5.217 2.557 3.425 4.492 2.004 
 (1.000) (0.411) (0.304) (1.000) (0.814) (0.278) (1.000) (0.876) (0.367) 
Wald 56.16*** 10.98*** 2.463 38.30*** 9.302*** 0.002 0.304 0.275 4.157** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.116) (0.000) (0.002) (0.958) (0.581) (0.600) (0.041) 
Countries  11 11 11 6 6 6 5 5 5 
Observations 99 44 22 54 24 12 45 20 10 
          
 Panel B: System GMM 
 Africa English French 
 
Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI 
Initial  0.986*** 0.957*** 1.057*** 1.037*** 0.964*** 1.043*** 1.010*** 0.967*** 1.062*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(1) --- --- 2.306** --- --- 1.533 --- --- --- 
   (0.021)   (0.125)    
AR(2) -2.189** 0.735 --- -1.743* 1.248 --- -1.292 -0.262 1.722* 
 (0.028) (0.462)  (0.081) (0.211)  (0.196) (0.792) (0.085) 
Sargan OIR 10.604 10.835 7.743 3.940 4.784 3.788 4.988 3.540 4.998 
 (1.000) (0.624) (0.101) (1.000) (0.979) (0.435) (1.000) (0.995) (0.287) 
Wald 1788.3*** 881.3*** 872.9*** 128.6*** 12410*** 907.5*** 46.20*** 690.6*** 454.5*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries  11 11 11 6 6 6 5 5 5 
Observations 110 55 33 60 30 18 50 25 15 
          
***,**,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions 
test. Initial: lagged endogenous estimated coefficient.  Yr: Year.  NOI: Non overlapping intervals.  Wald: test for the joint significance of 
estimated coefficients.  
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Table 3: Conditional convergence  
          
 Panel A: Difference GMM 
 Africa English French 
 Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI 
Initial  0.175 1.159** 0.302*** 0.101 0.504* 0.641*** -11.25 4.929 0.387*** 
 (0.631) (0.025) (0.002) (0.882) (0.059) (0.000) (0.398) (0.527) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.271 -0.167 -0.063 0.399 0.172 -0.730 0.141 13.81 -0.092 
 (0.526) (0.866) (0.925) (0.377) (0.110) (0.257) (0.969) (0.505) (0.508) 
Rule of Law -6.066* -7.80* -0.121 -7.152 -3.633 -1.71** 88.61 57.84 3.155*** 
 (0.080) (0.082) (0.895) (0.624) (0.447) (0.010) (0.468) (0.344) (0.006) 
GDP growth 0.120** 0.437* 0.063 0.012 0.251** 0.012 0.266 3.177 0.094 
 (0.017) (0.067) (0.120) (0.741) (0.010) (0.773) (0.210) (0.391) (0.348) 
Money Supply --- 7.017 -0.736 --- --- -7.00*** --- --- --- 
  (0.503) (0.773)   (0.007)    
PC Users  4.795 -2.250 -0.061 -10.78 --- 4.772 38.52 -94.79 --- 
 (0.615) (0.874) (0.989) (0.760)  (0.296) (0.108) (0.535)  
FDI  -0.201 0.132 -0.014 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.132) (0.313) (0.832)       
Trade -0.011 -0.053 -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.185) (0.122) (0.963)       
          
AR(1) --- --- -1.590 --- --- 0.501 --- --- -1.187 
   (0.111)   (0.615)   (0.234) 
AR(2) -0.898 -0.348 --- -0.240 0.288 --- -0.290 -0.648 --- 
 (0.369) (0.727)  (0.809) (0.772)  (0.771) (0.516)  
Sargan OIR 2.404 1.841 4.758 0.706 1.284 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.466 
 (1.000) (0.993) (0.092) (1.000) (0.998) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.291) 
Wald 11.132* 87.21*** 29.81*** 6.935 28.64*** 66.92*** 7.583 16.00*** 26.13*** 
 (0.084) (0.000) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000) (0.000) (0.108) (0.003) (0.000) 
Countries  11 11 11 6 6 6 5 5 5 
Observations 79 41 21 48 24 12 40 20 10 
          
 Panel B: System GMM 
 Africa English French 
 Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI 
Initial  -0.179 0.592*** 0.512*** -0.832 0.527** 0.439*** 1.093 0.514** 0.286*** 
 (0.784) (0.000) (0.000) (0.376) (0.020) (0.000) (0.114) (0.041) (0.003) 
Constant  8.953** 3.790*** 5.686*** -1.409 0.001 5.228*** 1.670 2.861 3.297 
 (0.039) (0.001) (0.000) (0.573) (0.998) (0.000) (0.419) (0.480) (0.168) 
Rule of Law -1.931* -0.470 -0.66** -4.341* -0.410 0.531 1.457 1.574 -1.478 
 (0.098) (0.398) (0.015) (0.050) (0.611) (0.498) (0.468) (0.724) (0.342) 
GDP growth 0.142** 0.358** 0.099 0.034 0.331** 0.089* -0.125 0.0009 -0.359 
 (0.049) (0.031) (0.199) (0.583) (0.015) (0.056) (0.526) (0.998) (0.424) 
Money Supply 0.904 0.422 -0.666 --- --- -5.974** --- --- --- 
 (0.734) (0.781) (0.179)   (0.032)    
PC Users  -2.387** -1.09*** -1.31*** --- --- -0.416 --- --- --- 
 (0.018) (0.003) (0.000)   (0.452)    
FDI  -0.166* 0.008 0.016 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.090) (0.923) (0.704)       
Trade -0.0001 -0.018 -0.009 0.075 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.994) (0.120) (0.155) (0.118)      
          
AR(1) --- --- -0.823 --- --- -1.061 --- --- -1.222 
   (0.410)   (0.288)   (0.221) 
AR(2) 0.0207 -0.002 --- -0.595 0.175 --- -0.923 -0.242 --- 
 (0.983) (0.997)  (0.551) (0.860)  (0.355) (0.808)  
Sargan OIR 3.169 3.940 5.748 0.685 4.176 0.000 0.144 2.912 3.926 
 (1.000) (0.991) (0.218) (1.000) (0.989) (1.000) (1.000) (0.998) (0.416) 
Wald 25.95*** 307.5*** 270.5*** 92.05*** 47.44*** 526.3*** 8.569** 8.998** 50.52*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.035) (0.029) (0.000) 
Countries  11 11 11 6 6 6 5 5 5 
Observations 84 52 32 54 30 18 45 25 15 
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%,  5% and 10% respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions 
test. Initial: lagged endogenous estimated coefficient. Yr: Year.  NOI: Non overlapping intervals.  Wald: test for the joint significance of 
estimated coefficients. PC: Personal Computer. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment.  
 
20 
 
4.2 Discussion of results 
 
4.2.1  Discussion and policy implications 
 
Before we dive into the discussion of results, it is important at the outset to understand 
the economic intuition motivating absolute and conditional convergence  of  software piracy 
rate in the African continent. Absolute convergence in software piracy occurs when countries 
share similar fundamental characteristics with regard to the laws governing private IP such 
that, only variations across countries in initial levels of software piracy exist. Absolute 
convergence therefore results from factors such as the formulation of laws protecting IPRs 
against software piracy within a legal system (e.g common-law countries, civil-law countries 
…etc)  or through multilateral IPRs treaties,  among others. Absolute convergence also occurs 
because of adjustments common to many countries with the same legal origin in the fight 
against piracy. Fundamentally, contrary to civil-law countries, common-law systems place 
more emphasis on IPRs vis-à-vis the power of the state. Thus, enforcements of laws 
governing IPRs against software piracy should influence the convergence in common-law 
countries faster than in their civil-law counterparts. Conversely, owing to regional 
corporations, multilateral agreements, globalization and the diffusion of laws overtime, 
common-law and civil law countries could also converge in software piracy at the same. This 
will empirically depend on the difference between their respective convergence rates.  
 On the other hand, conditional convergence is that which is contingent on structural 
and institutional characteristics of countries. Consistent with the economic growth literature 
(Barro, 1991), conditional convergence depicts the kind of convergence whereby, one’s own 
long-term steady state (equilibrium) is contingent on structural characteristics and 
fundamentals of its economy in general  and ICT sector in particular. For instance common-
law countries may differ substantially in the level of openness, economic prosperity, 
development of the ICT sector, internet penetration…etc. To this end, our model for 
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conditional convergence is contingent on institutional quality (rule of law), economic 
prosperity (GDP growth and money supply), ICT sector development (PC Users) and 
globalization (FDI and Trade for respectively financial and trade openness). Hence, findings 
are contingent on the macro economic variables we empirically test. Owing to constraints in 
data availability and degrees of freedom required for the Sargan-OIR test, we could not 
condition the analysis beyond six macroeconomic variables. This position on conditionality is 
more solid than in mainstream literature where,  specification of this form of convergence 
analysis is not conditioned beyond two macroeconomic variables (Bruno et al., 2011; Asongu, 
2012). 
Our findings have shown that in both absolute and conditional  terms, software piracy 
is converging within Africa. This rate of convergence almost doubles in the absence of 
structural and institutional characteristics (absolute convergence). Implying, a genuine 
platform for  standardizing IPRs laws in the fight against piracy is most likely between a 
horizon of 4 to 8 years. Put in other words, full (100%) convergence within the specified 
horizon means, feasibility of standard IPRs regimes without distinction of nationality and 
locality.  Based the two-year NOI, legal-origin does seem to be a factor in determining the 
rate of piracy. Surprisingly, contrary to mainstream literature (La Porta et al., 1998; North, 
1990, 1994), we do not find evidence of overwhelming dominance of English common-law 
countries from a software piracy standpoint. This could be due to regional corporations which 
have diluted legal-origin oriented IPRs laws over time. This finding was not predicted, as we 
expected convergence within common-law countries not to be the same as in civil-law 
countries because of the emphasis common-law places on IPRs protection. Hence, the 
argument that the institutional web of informal norms, formal rules and enforcement 
characteristics affect the quality of IPRs protection is not visible from a software piracy 
perspective. 
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 International organizations are currently advocating global convergence in IP as a 
prerequisite for successful innovation strategies. The interrelationships among IPRs, standard-
setting and software piracy is a complex one. With advances in ICTs,  standard-setting against 
the growing phenomenon of piracy is increasingly important as standardization has a 
particular important role of ensuring computability and interconnectivity of products and 
services. The difficulties of achieving such harmonization are however, evident from the 
attempts of several nations to develop divergent IP systems. Our results have shown that, 
countries with low software piracy rates are catching-up counterparts with higher rates; 
implying, despite existing divergent IP systems, convergence in piracy rate could be a genuine 
standard-setting platform. Standard-setting in software piracy will reduce transaction cost, 
enhance the value of IP, promote welfare by enhancing IPR holders’ incentive to innovate.   
 
4.2.2 Caveats 
 
 Two main caveats have been retained: the absence of a theoretical basis and, draw-backs 
in the methodology. Firstly, using econometrics to accomplish more than just testing theory is 
not without risks. The intuition basis of the work implies, results should be interpreted with 
caution as the model is conditioned on the variables we choose and empirically test, which 
may not directly reflect all macroeconomic conditions on which ‘piracy convergence’ is 
endogenous. Secondly, as we have already outlined in the first paragraph of Section 4.1, the 
choice of the converge approach (which is based on constraints in data structure) also has its 
draw-backs. Consistent with Apergis et al. (2008), critics of β-convergence argue that, if 
countries converge to a common equilibrium with identical internal structures, then the 
dispersion of the variable under consideration should disappear in the long-run as all countries 
converge to the same long-run path. If, however, states converge to ‘convergence clubs’ or to 
their own unique equilibrium, the dispersion of this measure will not approach zero (Miller & 
Upadhyay, 2002). Moreover, in the latter case of country-specific equilibrium, the movements 
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of the dispersion will depend on the initial distribution of the variable under investigation with 
regard to their final long-run outcomes. Overall, as argued by Caporale et al. (2009), the 
approach suffers from specific estimation deficiencies associated with the data structure. 
Indeed, piracy data is scarce and these issues can only be overcome with time.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In the current efforts of harmonizing the standards and enforcement of IPRs protection 
worldwide, this paper has explored software piracy trajectories and dynamics in Africa. To 
the best of our knowledge, no study has yet modeled current efforts placed on harmonizing 
the standard and enforcement of IPRs protection in the continent. The manner in which 
standards are set and harmonized have important consequences on the cost of products, 
economic efficiency and innovation. We have answered two questions that policy makers are 
most likely to ask before considering harmonizing IPRs regimes in the fight against piracy. 
(1) Is software piracy converging within Africa? (2) If so, what is the degree and timing of 
convergence?  
Three main findings have been established. (1) African countries with low software 
piracy rates are catching-up counterparts with higher rates; implying, despite existing 
divergent IP systems, convergence in piracy rate could be a genuine standard-setting platform. 
(2) Legal origins do not play a very significant role in the convergence process. (3)  A 
genuine timeframe for  standardizing IPRs laws in the fight against piracy is most likely 
between a horizon of 4 to 8 years. In other words, full (100%) convergence within the 
specified horizon means, enforcements of IPRs regimes without distinction of nationality and 
locality. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics and presentation of countries  
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  Mean  S.D  Min Max Obser. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Piracy rate 2.745 1.857 0.000 5.250 121 
       
 
 
Control 
Variables  
Rule of Law -0.302 0.687 -1.657 1.053 110 
Economic Prosperity (GDPg) 4.360 2.165 -3.653 10.600 121 
Financial depth (M2) 0.470 0.274 0.139 1.141 110 
Personal Computer (PC)  Users 2.633 0.527 1.699 3.758 121 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 2.527 2.902 -7.646 11.603 110 
Trade Openness  70.03 19.711 39.01 134.52 120 
       
Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
Algeria (F), Botswana (E), Cameroon (F), Egypt (F),  Kenya (E), Mauritius (E), Morocco (F), Nigeria (E), 
Senegal (F), South Africa (E), Zambia (E).  
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser: Observations. E: English Common Law countries. F: 
French Civil Law countries.  
 
Appendix 2: Variable definitions 
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources 
    
Piracy  Piracy  Logarithm of Piracy rate (annual %) BSA 
    
Rule of  Law  RL Rule of Law (Estimate) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic Prosperity   GDPg GDP Growth Rate (annual %)   World Bank (WDI) 
    
Financial Depth  M2 Monetary base plus demand, savings and time deposits (% 
of GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Personal Computer Users PC Users Logarithm of  Personal Computer Users World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign Direct Investment  FDI Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade Openness   Trade Import plus Exports of Commodities (% of GDP)   World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. BSA: Business Software Alliance. GDP: Gross 
Domestic Product. Log: Logarithm.  
 
 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix  
Piracy  RL GDPg M2 PC Users FDI Trade  
1.000 -0.434 0.169 -0.305 -0.156 0.066 -0.049 Piracy 
 1.000 -0.073 0.566 -0.095 0.129 0.578 RL 
  1.000 -0.036 0.035 0.378 0.095 GDPg 
   1.000 0.362 -0.041 0.356 M2 
    1.000 -0.122 -0.266 PC Users 
     1.000 0.100 FDI 
      1.000 Trade  
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